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Do Accounting Firm Consulting Revenues Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from the Pre- 
and Post-SOX Eras 
 
Abstract: In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the 
proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting 
revenue following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services 
provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications 
of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed 
by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the 
relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit 
quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of 
consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in 
the pre- and post-SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of 
audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of 
audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm 
consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following 
SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential 
economic magnitude of the effect is small. 
 
Keywords: accounting firms, audit quality, consulting services, nonaudit services 
JEL classifications: M41, M42  




Over the past decade, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the 
proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. In fact, by 2015, the largest U.S. 
public accounting firms were generating more revenue from consulting services than from 
assurance services. Proponents of accounting firms’ expansion of consulting services argue that 
providing consulting services can improve audit quality and thereby benefit investors. However, 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has expressed concerns about this 
trend. For example, in its five-year strategic plan for 2015 through 2019, the PCAOB suggests 
that it has the opportunity to further its mission by addressing the expansion of consulting 
services at large accounting firms, and it identifies difficulties in understanding the implications 
of the expansion of consulting services for audit quality as a threat to achieving its mission.1  
The debate over whether providing consulting services impairs audit quality has 
intensified during the past decade. On the one hand, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession (ACAP) and some academics argue that expanding the provision of consulting 
services can divert resources (e.g., attention, investments, and personnel) away from the 
assurance practice and potentially alter perceptions of accounting firm identity as well as how 
accounting firm professionals view their clients (ACAP 2008; Hermanson 2009; Dey et al. 
2012). Social identity theory suggests that individuals within an organization are prone to adopt 
the mindset or attitude perceived as characteristic of the organization (Ashforth and Mael 1989). 
This view suggests that expanding consulting services could undermine audit quality. On the 
other hand, a theoretical model developed by Fischer and Huddart (2008) suggests that strong 
social norms related to professionalism can guard against a deterioration in audit quality in dual-
                                                 
1 See https://pcaobus.org/About/Administration/Documents/Strategic%20Plans/2015-2019.pdf. 
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service accounting firms. Accounting firms also assert that consulting staff often provide 
valuable insights to the assurance practice because they act as specialists on audit engagements.2 
Additionally, provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) restrict public accounting 
firms to offering very limited types of consulting services to public audit clients.3 These factors 
suggest an alternative view – that expanding consulting services could instead improve audit 
quality. A final possibility is that the improved insights from specialists could offset any 
diversion of resources such that increased consulting services would have no detectable effect on 
audit quality. We contribute to this debate by providing archival evidence on the association 
between the proportion of accounting firm revenues generated from consulting services (at the 
U.S. audit firm level) and both audit quality and perceptions of audit quality.  
Pre-SOX, public accounting firms derived substantial revenues from providing consulting 
services, with a sizeable portion coming from their audit clients. However, because of growing 
pressure from regulators to address real and perceived threats to independence from providing 
consulting services to audit clients, most large accounting firms divested their consulting 
practices. In addition, SOX restricted accounting firms from providing a number of nonaudit 
services to their public audit clients. Since the enactment of SOX, accounting firms have 
increased their consulting revenues by performing consulting services for nonaudit clients, 
                                                 
2 For example, Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) both state that they utilize their consulting professionals 
as specialists on audit engagements and that this improves the quality of their audits (see, e.g., “Audit Quality: Our 
Responsibility, Our Commitment”, available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets 
/Documents/AERS/us_aers_audit_quality_report_011314.pdf, and “Our Focus on Audit Quality: 2013 Report”, 
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/audit-assurance-services/publications/assets/2013-audit-quality-
report.pdf).   
3 SOX prohibits public accounting firms from providing a wide range of consulting services to their public audit 
clients. Although we cannot directly observe the portion of consulting revenues generated by providing consulting 
services to private audit clients, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (Rule 101-3: Nonattest Services) 
instituted many of the same restrictions as SOX on the provision of consulting services to private audit clients. Our 
conversations with experienced Big 4 consulting personnel indicate that the majority of consulting revenues are 
generated from public nonaudit clients rather than private clients. As such, we attribute the growth in consulting 
revenue in recent years to consulting services provided to nonaudit clients. 
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allowing them to avoid concerns related to impaired independence. However, the academic 
research to date focuses exclusively on nonaudit services provided to public audit clients (and 
provides mixed evidence regarding its impact on audit quality). Whether consulting services 
provided to nonaudit clients impair audit quality remains an open and important empirical 
question because both independence impairment concerns and the potential for knowledge 
spillovers of client-specific information do not exist when accounting firms provide consulting 
services to nonaudit clients. Therefore, our study addresses questions that have received 
regulatory, academic, and practitioner attention, but have not yet been examined empirically. 
Accounting Today publishes an annual list of the largest 100 public accounting firms in 
the U.S., ranked by total revenues. This list provides the proportion of each firm’s revenues 
generated from audit and assurance (A&A), tax, management advisory services (MAS), and 
other services. We use this list to measure each accounting firm’s consulting services as the 
proportion of its U.S. revenues derived from MAS and other services.4 Using this measure, we 
first examine the association between accounting firm revenues generated from consulting 
services and audit quality, where we use annual financial statement misstatements as revealed 
through subsequent restatements to proxy for audit quality. Additionally, because SOX 
drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms and increased 
public company audit regulation, we examine these relations both before and after SOX. 
Overall, our results suggest that before SOX, when public audit clients provided an 
important source of consulting revenues, higher levels of accounting firm consulting revenues 
negatively impacted audit quality. However, following SOX, we do not find a statistically 
                                                 
4 Although our consulting services measure includes revenues from other services, the proportion of revenues 
derived from other services is small, averaging only 9.2 percent of revenues for Accounting Today’s Top 100 firms 
from 2000 through 2013. Our inferences are robust to measuring consulting services as the proportion of an 
accounting firm’s U.S. revenues derived from MAS only. 
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significant association between consulting revenues and audit quality. Our analyses suggest that 
even if this relation does exist post-SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small. 
In additional analyses, we also find that pre-SOX, audit quality was lower when accounting firms 
generated the majority of their revenues from consulting services and when increases in 
accounting firm revenues generated from consulting services were larger. However, post-SOX, 
we do not find a statistically significant association between audit quality and these measures of 
consulting revenues. Our inferences remain unchanged when we examine only misstatements 
identified through Item 4.02 non-reliance restatements and when we perform analyses at the 
audit firm-year level using Big N and second tier audit firms. As such, our collective evidence 
suggests that the recent growth in accounting firm consulting revenues, which are generated 
primarily from nonaudit clients, has not resulted in an economically significant deterioration in 
audit quality.  
Next, we examine whether investors perceive accounting firms’ provision of consulting 
services as improving or impairing audit quality. We use annual short-window earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs) to proxy for market perceptions of audit quality following Francis and Ke 
(2006) and Ghosh et al. (2009). Similar to our audit quality tests, we find that before SOX, ERCs 
are smaller when a greater proportion of audit firm revenue is derived from consulting services. 
These results suggest that before SOX, capital market participants perceived a deterioration of 
audit quality when a higher proportion of accounting firm revenues were generated from 
consulting. Following SOX, we do not find a statistically significant association between 
consulting revenues and short-window ERCs. Our analyses again suggest that even if this 
relation does exist post-SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.  
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Our paper contributes to the academic literature and provides valuable information to 
regulators, accounting firms, and investors. First, we contribute to the ongoing debate regarding 
whether public accounting firms’ expansion of consulting services impacts audit quality. Our 
results suggest that when audit clients are an important source of consulting revenues, these 
revenues negatively impact audit quality and perceptions of audit quality but when consulting 
revenues come primarily from nonaudit clients, these revenues have little to no detectable 
economic effect on audit quality or perceptions of audit quality. Second, because the expansion 
of consulting revenues post-SOX is primarily attributable to consulting provided to nonaudit 
clients, our study addresses questions that have received regulatory and academic attention, but 
have not yet been examined empirically.  
Our paper also contributes to research examining the effect of non-tax, non-audit services 
on engagement-level audit quality. Paterson and Valencia (2011) find a positive relation between 
certain audit-related non-audit services and misstated years that are subsequently restated after 
the enactment of SOX. Consistent with this, we find that, following SOX, higher levels of 
advisory and other non-tax, non-audit services not only increase the likelihood of misstatement at 
the engagement level, but also negatively impact investor perceptions of audit quality (i.e., short-
window ERCs).   
We acknowledge the limitations inherent in our measure of consulting services at the 
audit firm level. Although our inclusion of all of Accounting Today’s “Top 100” firms with 
available data provides some variation in our variable of interest, this variation is somewhat 
limited because a large percentage of the sample are clients of the Big 4 firms. Furthermore, 
consulting revenue is not available from the accounting firms at more granular levels (e.g., at the 
office level, partner level, or by service type).  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background 
and reviews related literature. Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses our 
research design. Section 5 describes our sample  and summary statistics. Section 6 presents our 
empirical results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background and Related Literature 
In the 1980s and 1990s, public accounting firms derived substantial revenues from 
consulting services, with a sizeable portion coming from their audit clients.5 Assurance 
engagements were sometimes characterized as ‘loss leaders,’ designed to secure more lucrative 
consulting engagements. Consulting engagements were highly profitable and experienced growth 
rates nearly double those of typical audit work.6  
Regulators, investors, and academics have long debated whether the provision of 
nonaudit services to audit clients impairs audit quality. Public accounting firms argue that the 
provision of nonaudit services to audit clients produces knowledge spillovers that increase both 
the effectiveness and efficiency of audits (Simunic 1984). Regulators, however, argue that the 
provision of nonaudit services to audit clients strengthens the economic bond between 
accounting firms and their clients, thereby threatening auditor independence (Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness 2000). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, accounting firms faced growing pressure from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and from investors to address perceived conflicts of 
interest resulting from providing consulting services to audit clients. As a result, most large 
                                                 
5 See “BearingPoint: The End of an Era” in AccountingWEB.com (2009); available at: 
http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/firm-news/bearingpoint-end-era. 
6 See “Cap Gemini Merges with EY Consulting” in AccountingWEB.com (2000); available at: 
http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/firm-news/cap-gemini-merges-ey-consulting. 
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accounting firms divested their consulting practices.7 Additionally, SOX restricted accounting 
firms from providing most nonaudit services to their public audit clients.8 The restrictions 
imposed by SOX and the divestiture of the consulting practices combined to significantly reduce 
the amount of consulting revenues earned by public accounting firms in the early 2000s and alter 
the source of the consulting revenues afterwards. Since then, accounting firms have expanded 
their consulting revenues by performing consulting services for nonaudit clients, which allows 
them to avoid the appearance of impaired independence. 
 Over the past decade, many of the large accounting firms have rebuilt their consulting 
practices both organically and through acquisitions.9 In a December 2014 speech at the AICPA 
Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, PCAOB Chairman Doty cautioned 
against the marked reduction in audit revenues, especially for the global, networked accounting 
firms.10 Similarly, in a October 2016 speech at the NYSSCPA SEC Conference, PCAOB Board 
Member Steven Harris discussed the rise of consulting and advisory services in audit firms as 
one of the PCAOB’s current priorities.11  
                                                 
7 Specifically, Ernst & Young (in 2000), KPMG (in 2001), Andersen (in 2001), and PwC (in 2002) all sold or spun-
off their consulting practices, making Deloitte the only Big 5 accounting firm to retain its consulting practice. See 
Dey et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion of the divestiture process at each firm.  
8 Specifically, SOX Section 201(a) prohibits the provision of the following nonaudit services to audit clients: “(1) 
bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) 
financial information systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or 
contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management or human 
resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal services and expert 
services unrelated to the audit; and 9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible” 
(United States Code 2002, 771). However, all services not specifically banned by SOX are still permitted with audit 
committee pre-approval. These services include, but are not limited to, providing comfort letters to debt holders, 
assistance in making regulatory filings, due diligence and transaction support, forensic services, pension advisory 
services, and other attestation work outside of the audit. 
9 See, for example, “Deloitte Agrees to Buy BearingPoint Unit” in the NYTimes.com, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/deloitte-agrees-to-buy-bearingpoint-unit/. In this deal, Deloitte purchased 
KPMG’s former consulting practice. Also see “Pricewaterhouse to Buy Booz Consulting Firm” in the New York 
Times (October 31, 2013, sec. B). 
10 See http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/12082014_Doty_AICPA.aspx. 
11 See https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/Harris-speech-NYSSCPA-10-25-16.aspx. 
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Academic research to date focuses exclusively on nonaudit services provided to audit 
clients and provides mixed evidence regarding the impact on audit quality. Frankel et al. (2002) 
find that nonaudit fees billed to audit clients are positively associated with earnings management 
proxies, and Krishnan et al. (2011) find a positive association between pre-SOX absolute 
discretionary accruals and the magnitude of the decline in nonaudit fees in the post-SOX period. 
Kinney et al. (2004) find a positive association between restatements and unspecified non-audit 
services prior to SOX. Findings in these studies are consistent with the argument that, in the pre-
SOX period, greater dependence on nonaudit fees resulted in lower audit quality. Beardsley et al. 
(2016) suggest that in the mid-2000’s, audit offices increased the sale of nonaudit services to 
audit clients as a way to compensate for audit fee pressure, and the combination of audit fee 
pressure and the increased focus on nonaudit services results in lower audit quality, as proxied by 
the rate of client misstatements. Similarly, Paterson and Valencia (2011) find a positive 
association between restatements and audit-related and other non-audit service revenues from 
2003 through 2006. They also find that the association is larger for non-recurring audit-related 
non-audit services than for recurring audit-related services. 
A number of other studies document contrary evidence. Using pre-SOX data, Nam and 
Ronen (2012) and Koh et al. (2013) find evidence of improved financial statement quality as 
clients pay greater amounts of nonaudit fees to their auditors. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Chung 
and Kallapur (2003), however, do not find an association between the provision of nonaudit 
services to audit clients and earnings quality. Using a difference-in-differences design, Lennox 
(2016) finds no change in audit quality (measured using misstatements, tax-related 
misstatements, and going concern opinions) following a quasi-exogenous shock to the amount of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460102
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auditor-provided tax services. In addition, DeFond et al. (2002) do not find a relation between 
nonaudit fees and auditors’ propensity to issue going concern opinions to distressed clients.  
To our knowledge, prior research is silent on the impact of audit firm-level consulting 
revenues on audit quality. Additionally, because SOX prohibits public accounting firms from 
providing a host of consulting services to their audit clients, the expansion of the consulting 
revenues over the past decade derives largely from nonaudit clients. To our knowledge prior 
research has not examined the impact of consulting services provided to nonaudit clients on audit 
quality. Whether consulting services provided to nonaudit clients impair audit quality is an 
important empirical question because both independence impairment concerns and the potential 
for knowledge spillovers of client-specific information do not exist when accounting firms 
provide consulting services to nonaudit clients. Therefore, any findings from prior literature 
would not necessarily generalize to our setting.  
3. Development of Hypotheses 
According to Ashforth and Mael (1989, 26-27), “social identification enables the 
individual to feel loyal to an organization or corporate culture… the individual typically adopts 
those characteristics perceived as prototypical of the groups with which he or she identifies... this 
identity may be reflected in shared values and beliefs … organizational climate, and so on.” 
Social identity theory suggests that higher levels of audit firm consulting revenue could affect the 
attitudes and mindsets of individual auditors, leading to an increased focus on client satisfaction 
and a reduction in the skeptical evaluation of audit evidence. Fischer and Huddart (2008) 
develop a principal-agent model to investigate how endogenous social norms influence the 
decisions of professionals. Specifically, they model how the social norms of the audit practice, 
which rely on using sound accounting judgment and high professional standards, compete with 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460102
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incentives of the consulting practice, which center on providing client satisfaction, in dual-
service public accounting firms. They suggest that in these accounting firms, high social norms 
related to accounting professionalism can create strong incentives for high audit quality among 
audit personnel but if the incentives provided by the consulting practice are more powerful than 
the social norms related to professionalism, then audit quality can suffer. In this study, we 
empirically investigate whether an increased focus on generating consulting revenues appears to 
have eroded the social norms within accounting firms such that audit quality has been impaired. 
On the one hand, regulators and academics suggest that accounting firms’ increased focus 
on providing consulting services has eroded the professionalism (or social norms) of accounting 
firms in a number of ways. For example, Arthur Wyatt, a former Senior Partner and Managing 
Director at Arthur Andersen LLP, asserts that his former firm’s “commercial interests had 
undermined the core values of the professional firm” (Wyatt 2004, 50). Although SOX changed 
the source of consulting revenues, in their 2008 report to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
ACAP asserted that the expansion of consulting services to nonaudit clients merely substituted 
concerns regarding resource diversion for concerns regarding auditor independence (ACAP 
2008). Additionally, Hermanson (2009) outlines other ways in which an increased focus on 
consulting can erode accounting firm professional norms. These include causing confusion about 
who the accounting firm’s client is (i.e., management versus investors and the audit committee), 
creating intra-firm conflicts about compensation of audit versus consulting professionals, and 
increasing profit pressure, which distracts audit professionals from focusing on audit quality. 
Finally, Dey et al. (2012) suggest that large accounting firms may be tempted to shed audit 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460102
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clients in order to expand their base of potential consulting clients because consulting 
engagements are typically more profitable than audit engagements.12  
On the other hand, some practitioners and accounting firms assert that the provision of 
consulting services can enhance audit quality. For example, Goldwasser (2002) suggests that 
nonaudit service revenues improve the viability of the public accounting industry and relieve 
price competition for audit services. Additionally, accounting firms promote the idea that the 
expertise developed by their consulting professionals can improve the quality of audit 
engagements that utilize these consultants as specialists. Specifically, in accordance with AU 
336.03(c),13 Using the Work of a Specialist, accounting firms can assign personnel from their 
consulting practices to act as specialists on their audit engagement teams.14 Moreover, in its 2013 
audit quality report, Deloitte states that the use of its financial advisory, tax, and consulting 
professionals as specialists on audit engagements is “an indispensable asset that contributes to 
the quality of our audits” and in its 2013 audit quality report, PwC explains that by utilizing the 
knowledge of its consultants as specialists, audit teams are able to “better evaluate complex 
transactions, assess accounting treatments, and identify areas where additional professional 
skepticism may be warranted.”15 The PwC report goes on to identify information technology (IT) 
specialists as a group that substantially improves audit quality because they assist audit teams in 
                                                 
12 Consistent with this, PwC’s former client Hillshire Brands Co. recently announced that PwC would no longer be 
its auditor because the company had a consulting agreement with Booz (which PwC acquired in April 2014). See 
“PricewaterhouseCoopers Renaming Booz & Co. as 'Strategy&'” in the Wall Street Journal, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303987004579477642677243618. 
13 AU 336.03(c) will become AS 1210.03(c) in the reorganized PCAOB auditing standards, which become effective 
at the end of 2016. 
14 For example, an audit engagement team for a manufacturing client can use a valuation specialist from its financial 
services advisory practice to assist with evaluating management’s assertions related to the valuation, presentation, 
and disclosure of financial derivatives. 
15 See page 13 of “Audit Quality: Our Responsibility, Our Commitment”, available at http://www.deloitte.com/ 
assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/AERS/us_aers_audit_quality_report_011314.pdf, and page 
19 of “Our Focus on Audit Quality: 2013 Report”, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/audit-assurance-
services/publications/assets/2013-audit-quality-report.pdf. 
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understanding complex IT internal control systems. In fact, consulting professionals play a 
sizeable role on audit engagement teams and their work comprised approximately 10 percent of 
PwC’s total engagement hours in 2013.16 Finally, Fischer and Huddart (2008) point out that 
dual-service accounting firms can install additional control systems to promote high audit 
quality.  
Because the provision of consulting services can have either a detrimental or beneficial 
effect on audit quality, we state our first hypothesis in the null form as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1a. The proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from consulting 
services is not associated with audit quality. 
 
We also examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm revenue 
generated from consulting services and audit quality in the pre- and post-SOX periods. Prior to 
SOX, public audit clients provided an important source of consulting revenues, while much of 
the growth in consulting revenues post-SOX comes from nonaudit clients due to limitations 
imposed by SOX. As such, following SOX, independence impairment is less of a concern and 
the potential for client-specific knowledge spillovers is greatly reduced. In addition, SOX 
brought significant reform to public company auditor oversight through the formation of the 
PCAOB. Accounting firms assert that the PCAOB inspection process has improved the quality 
of their audits.17 Given the nature of the changes brought about by SOX, it is not clear whether 
any pre-SOX relation between audit quality and the proportion of accounting firm revenue 
                                                 
16 See page 19 of “Our Focus on Audit Quality: 2013 Report”, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/audit-
assurance-services/publications/assets/2013-audit-quality-report.pdf. 
17 For example, on page 21 of an Ernst & Young publication about their commitment to audit quality, available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-our-commitment-to-audit-quality/$FILE/ey-our-commitment-to-
audit-quality.pdf, the firm states, “We want to drive further improvements in audit quality and are fully committed 
to doing so. We value the PCAOB inspection process because it helps us identify areas where we can continue to 
improve our performance.”  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460102
13 
 
generated from consulting services would hold post-SOX. This discussion leads to the following 
null hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1b. The proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from consulting 
services is not associated with audit quality pre-SOX. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1c. The proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from consulting 
services is not associated with audit quality post-SOX. 
 
In addition to evaluating whether consulting services impact audit quality, we examine 
whether consulting services enhance or impair investor perceptions of audit quality. Prior studies 
use ERCs (i.e., the impact of earnings news on investor beliefs about company value) to proxy 
for investor perceptions of audit quality. For example, Teoh and Wong (1993) interpret the 
higher ERCs of clients that engage Big N audit firms as suggesting that investors perceive audit 
firm size to enhance audit quality, presumably because Big N audit firms have “deeper pockets” 
and more reputational capital at stake.   
In our setting, if investors perceive audit quality to be lower (either due to potential 
resource diversion or changing social norms) when accounting firms generate a greater 
proportion of their revenues from consulting services, ERCs should be attenuated. Conversely, if 
investors perceive audit quality to be higher (because audit firms can use consulting personnel to 
provide specialist knowledge on audit engagements) when accounting firms generate a greater 
proportion of their revenues from consulting services, ERCs should be enhanced. 
Because the provision of consulting services can have a detrimental or beneficial effect 
on investor perceptions of audit quality, we state our second hypothesis in the null, as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2a: The proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from consulting 
services is not associated with investor perceptions of audit quality. 
 
As previously discussed, given the nature of the changes brought about by SOX, it is not 
clear whether any pre-SOX relation between the proportion of accounting firm revenue 
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generated from consulting services and investor perceptions of audit quality would hold post-
SOX. Therefore, we present the following null hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 2b. The proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from consulting 
services is not associated with investor perceptions of audit quality pre-SOX. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2c. The proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from consulting 
services is not associated with investor perceptions of audit quality post-SOX. 
 
4. Research Design  
Tests of Audit Quality 
We proxy for audit quality using misstatements (as revealed through subsequent financial 
statement restatements). Christensen et al. (2016) find that auditors and investors view financial 
statement restatements as the leading indicator of low audit quality. Additionally, Aobdia (2017) 
finds that among audit quality proxies used in the archival audit literature, restatements are best 
able to predict PCAOB inspection report Part I findings. Finally, auditing standards require the 
auditor to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the annual 
financial statements are free of material misstatement (PCAOB 2003). As such, annual financial 
statement restatements provide direct evidence of a misstatement that was not detected and 
reported. For these reasons, financial statement restatements are often used in academic studies 
to identify lower audit quality (e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; Stanley and DeZoort 2007; Schmidt 
2012; Francis and Michas 2013).  
To test our first set of hypotheses, we estimate the following model, with standard errors 
clustered by client:  
Pr(Misstateit = 1) = α0 + α1%MASjt-1 + α2MAS_clientit + α3Tax_clientit + α4LnAFEEit  
+ α5BigNit + α6SecondTierit + α7Specialistit + α8SQRTTenureit + α9ICMWit  
+ α10LnAssetsit + α11Leverageit + α12MTBit + α13FINit + α14FREECit  
+ α15M&Ait + α16ROAit + α17Lossit + α18ARINVit + α19VarReturnit  
+ α20OffSizeit + αjIndustry FE + αkYear FE + ɛit            (1) 
where: 




Misstate  = an indicator variable set equal to one if the annual financial statements were misstated 
(as revealed through a subsequent restatement), and zero otherwise (restatement data 
from Audit Analytics);18  
 
%MAS = the proportion of U.S. management advisory and other fees (i.e., consulting revenues) 
to total U.S. revenue, calculated at the accounting-firm level as (MAS + Other fees) / 
(Audit + Tax + MAS + Other fees) from Accounting Today; 
 
and control variables are defined in the Appendix.  
The coefficient of interest is α1, the coefficient on %MAS. Because providing a high 
proportion of consulting services is unlikely to have an immediate effect on an accounting firm’s 
social norms and culture, especially if the source and amount of revenues earned by the firm are 
reported only annually within the organization, we estimate equation (1) using the audit firm’s 
one-year lagged consulting to total revenue ratio.19 The control variables follow prior literature 
(e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Summers and Sweeney 1998; Kinney et al. 2004; Blankley et al. 2012; 
Cao et al. 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013) to the extent that these variables are widely available for 
our sample. Coefficient estimates α2 and α3 control for potential independence impairment or 
knowledge spillover generated by MAS/other and tax services performed for the audit client. To 
test Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 1c, we estimate equation (1) separately using pre-SOX and 
post-SOX sample partitions. 
Tests of Perceptions of Audit Quality  
                                                 
18 In untabulated analyses, we include only non-clerical error misstatements and our inferences are unchanged. 
19 In sensitivity analyses, we examine the effect of the audit firm’s contemporaneous and two-year lagged consulting 
to total revenue ratios and our inferences are unchanged. 
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Following Francis and Ke (2006) and Ghosh et al. (2009), we use short-window ERCs in 
the three days around the announcement of annual earnings to proxy for market perceptions of 
audit quality.20 Here, we estimate the following model, with standard errors clustered by client: 
CAR = β0 + β1FERR + β2%MASjt-1 + β3FERR×%MASjt-1 + β4X + β5Industry FE  




CAR  = abnormal (market-adjusted) returns cumulated over days [-1, +1] relative to the 
annual earnings announcement;  
 
FERR  = analyst forecast error, measured as the difference between reported annual earnings 
per share and the most recent median consensus analyst earnings forecast, deflated by 
stock price at the end of the fiscal year;  
 
%MAS = as previously defined; and  
 
control variables are defined in the Appendix.  
We measure %MAS, MAS_client, and Tax_client at the end of the previous year so that 
the information is available to investors. Consistent with prior research, the ERC is the 
coefficient on FERR. The impact of consulting services on the ERC (Hypothesis 2a) is captured 
by β3; a positive (negative) value would indicate that consulting services enhance (impair) the 
market’s perception of audit quality.  
To test Hypothesis 2b and Hypothesis 2c, we estimate equation (2) separately using the 
pre-SOX and post-SOX sample partitions. Our control variables follow prior literature (e.g., 
Francis and Ke 2006; Ghosh et al. 2009) and, again, we control for potential independence 
impairment or knowledge spillovers from providing MAS/other or tax services to the audit 
                                                 
20 Note that this test assumes that investors are aware of the growth in accounting firm consulting practices. This is 
likely because industry analysts and the media comment on recent growth in consulting revenues. See, for example, 
IBISWorld Industry Report 54121c: Accounting Services in the U.S. (June 2014), available at: 
http://clients1.ibisworld.com/reprots/us/industry/default.aspx?entid=1398.   
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client. We include year fixed effects to control for variation in ERCs over time that are unrelated 
to variation in accounting firm consulting revenues.  
5. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
 We collect public accounting firms’ annual revenue from Accounting Today’s “Top 100 
Firms” reports. Accounting Today is a monthly trade magazine, distributed through Lexis Nexis, 
Business Source Complete, and other databases, that focuses on tax and accounting news. 
Accounting Today publishes the “Top 100 Firms” ranking annually using the accounting firms’ 
self-reported U.S. revenues. The rankings present total revenue as well as the percentage of 
revenue from A&A, tax, and MAS business lines. Because audit and non-audit fee disclosures 
were not available for U.S. public companies until 2000 and because Audit Analytics coverage 
of restatements is sparse prior to this year, our sample period begins in 2000. We end the sample 
period in 2013 to allow sufficient time for misstatements to be revealed. For our audit quality 
tests, our samples are limited to company-year observations with the necessary data from 
Compustat, Audit Analytics, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to construct 
our model variables. For our audit quality perception tests, our samples are limited to company-
year observations with the necessary data from Compustat, Audit Analytics, CRSP, and I/B/E/S.  
Table 1 presents a summary of our sample selection procedures. Merging company-year 
observations with fiscal year-ends from 2000 through 2013 from Compustat, Audit Analytics, 
and CRSP, yields 84,177 company-year observations. Because Accounting Today does not 
provide MAS data for KPMG for 2004 through 2006, we remove KPMG clients in 2005 through 
2007, where one year lagged MAS data is missing (deleting 3,672 company-year 
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observations).21 We also remove observations missing data required to construct model variables 
(27,726 company-year observations), observations where the signing auditor office is located 
outside of the U.S. (5,751 company-year observations), and observations with missing one-year 
lagged MAS amounts (164 company-year observations), resulting in a sample of 46,864 
company-year observations.22 The final sample includes clients of 79 unique audit firms, with 
553 unique auditor-year combinations of %MAS (constructed at the audit-firm level). For our 
tests of perceptions of audit quality, we begin with the 46,864 company-year observations used 
in our audit quality tests and retain all observations with data from Compustat, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S required to perform our tests. We remove 297 observations with a stock price less than 
one dollar at the end of the fiscal year, which reduces noise caused by small FERR deflators 
(Livnat and Mendenhall 2006).23 The final sample for our short-window market reaction test 
consists of 27,124 company-year observations. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 presents the proportions of revenues from A&A, tax, and MAS for the “Top 
100” U.S. public accounting firms, as reported in Accounting Today, from 2000 through 2015.24 
While the percentage of revenue from tax services remained between 20 to 35 percent for most 
of this period, the trends for A&A and MAS services demonstrate more variation and move 
inversely. The majority of accounting firm revenue was generated from MAS in 2000 (which 
pre-dated the divestiture of four of the Big 5 accounting firms’ consulting practices and 
                                                 
21 Accounting Today includes KPMG’s MAS revenues in A&A revenues and reports zero MAS revenues for 2004 
through 2006. However, our inferences are robust to including KPMG clients from 2005 through 2007 and using the 
MAS and A&A revenues as reported in Accounting Today. 
22 We remove observations where the office is located outside the U.S. because the Accounting Today revenue 
figures are provided at the U.S. level.  
23 In untabulated tests, inferences are consistent if we include these observations in the sample.  
24 The percentage of revenues derived from A&A, tax, and MAS differ by audit firm and year. Arthur Andersen 
LLP is included in the figure from 2000 through 2002.   
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restrictions on the types of nonaudit services that could be performed for audit clients under 
SOX). From 2004 through 2009, revenue from MAS fell to as little as 21 percent of total 
revenue, as accounting firms divested their consulting practices due to the SOX restrictions 
placed on nonaudit services for public audit clients and an increasing demand for assurance 
services related to internal controls over financial reporting. Over the same time period, the 
percentage of A&A revenue climbed, reaching a peak of almost 54 percent by 2007. Since 2009, 
the percentage revenue from MAS has increased dramatically, and the percentage of revenue 
from A&A has declined.25 As of 2015, the percentage of revenue derived from MAS has again 
become the largest source of revenue for the “Top 100” U.S. public accounting firms, slightly 
outpacing A&A.  
[insert Figure 1 here] 
Although MAS has once again become the largest source of revenue for accounting 
firms, they now generate MAS revenues from different sources (clients) than was previously the 
case. For example, the 2000 edition of the “Top 100 Firms” discusses the ‘cross-selling’ of 
financial planning, technology, employee benefits, and business valuation consulting services to 
audit clients as major sources of MAS revenue generation, but SOX prohibited the provision of 
these services to public audit clients and significantly reduced the extent of nonaudit services 
provided by accounting firms to their public audit clients (Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009). It 
follows that the revenue growth in MAS since 2009 is driven by the provision of consulting 
services to nonaudit clients. This trend is apparent in Figure 2, which presents the average ratio 
of non-audit, non-tax fees to total public audit client fees (MAS_client) over the sample period. 
In 2000, these non-tax-related non-audit fees represented approximately 35 percent of total 
                                                 
25 Dey et al. (2012) discuss how the expiration of the non-compete agreements signed by Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PwC with their former consulting arms contributed to the growth in consulting services during this time. 
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public audit client fees, but from 2003 through 2013, these fees represent less than 3 percent of 
total public audit client fees, on average. These figures highlight that although public audit 
clients were an important source of MAS revenues before SOX, MAS revenues following SOX 
are no longer generated largely from public audit clients. 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics for fee-related variables for client-year 
observations at the intersection of Accounting Today and Audit Analytics for the full sample 
(from 2000 through 2013), as well as for the pre- and post-SOX subsamples. Unlike Figure 1, 
which presents average fee percentages for the Accounting Today “Top 100 Firms,” these 
statistics are presented for all client observations with available data audited by one of these 
accounting firms during the sample period. The Accounting Today revenue figures include 
revenues received from both publicly-traded and private clients while Audit Analytics covers 
only publicly-traded companies and reports annual audit and audit-related fees, tax fees, and 
other fees paid to the auditor. Therefore, mean values of %MAS in Table 2 differ somewhat from 
percentages in Figure 1.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
Using the data from Accounting Today, we find that accounting firms’ average one-year 
lagged revenues from consulting services as a percent of total U.S. revenue (%MAS) is 25.8 
percent over our full sample period. Before SOX, this average was much higher, at 43.7 percent, 
than it is post-SOX, at 20.4 percent (a decrease which is significant at p < 0.001). Using data 
from Audit Analytics, we also find that, before SOX, 25.9 percent of the total fees paid by public 
audit clients were for non-tax, nonaudit services, on average, while these same fees account for 
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only 1.4 percent of the total fees paid by public audit clients following SOX (a decrease which is 
significant at p < 0.001).  
Panel B presents summary statistics for other model variables. We find that 12.4 percent 
of company-years in the sample are misstated, as identified through a subsequent restatement 
announcement. When examining the pre- and post-SOX subsamples separately (untabulated), we 
find that 15.0 percent of observations make misstatements in the pre-SOX period and 11.6 
percent of observations make misstatements in the post-SOX period. Descriptive statistics for 
other model variables are consistent with those from prior research.  
Table 3 provides pair-wise correlations between model variables. We find a significant 
positive correlation between misstatements and the one-year lagged proportion of accounting 
firm revenue generated from consulting services (%MAS). We also find a positive correlation 
between misstatements and the ratio of non-tax, nonaudit fees to total public audit client fees 
(MAS_client) and between misstatements and public audit client-specific tax fees to total public 
audit client fees (Tax_client). We find a strong positive correlation between %MAS and the ratio 
of non-tax, nonaudit fees to total public audit client fees (MAS_client). In untabulated analysis, 
we find that this positive correlation is much stronger in the pre-SOX period than in the post-
SOX period, which is consistent with firms generating more of their non-tax non-audit fees from 
non-public clients during the post-SOX period.26  
[insert Table 3 here] 
6. Empirical Results 
Tests of Audit Quality 
                                                 
26 Specifically, in the pre-SOX period, we find a positive and significant Pearson correlation between %MAS and 
MAS_client (of 0.260) and a positive and significant Spearman correlation (of 0.204) but in the post-SOX period, we 
find a positive and significant Pearson correlation (of 0.046) and a negative and significant Spearman correlation (of 
-0.019).  
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Table 4 presents the results from our first hypotheses related to restatements. Using the 
full sample in Column (1), we find a positive and significant coefficient on %MAS, which 
suggests that a higher level of consulting revenue at the audit firm level is positively associated 
with the likelihood that a financial statement misstatement is not detected and/or reported by the 
auditor. When partitioning our sample into pre- and post-SOX observations, we find that this 
relation is statistically significant pre-SOX (as reported in Column 2), but is statistically 
insignificant post-SOX (as reported in Column 3). Further analysis suggests that the statistically 
significant result pre-SOX is economically meaningful, while the insignificant result post-SOX is 
economically inconsequential. Specifically, the percentage change in the odds of a misstatement 
for a two standard deviation change in %MASit-1 in the pre-SOX period is approximately 48 
percent, but in the post-SOX period, it is less than one percent.27 These results suggest that 
before SOX, when public audit clients provided an important source of consulting revenues, 
higher levels of prior year accounting firm consulting revenues negatively impacted audit quality 
but this relation does not persist after SOX, when regulations restrict public audit clients from 
providing an important source of consulting revenues.28 In the full and post-SOX subsamples, 
consistent with Paterson and Valencia (2011), we find a positive and significant association 
between the ratio of client-specific advisory and other fees to total public audit client fees 
                                                 
27 We calculate the percent change in the odds of a misstatement for a two standard deviation change in %MASit-1 as 
(100*(e(β * 2 standard deviations) – 1)). In the pre-SOX period, this equals 48.209 (100*(e(1.178 * 0.334) – 1)) and in the post-
SOX period, this equals 0.859 (100*(e(0.031 * 0.276) – 1)). 
28 Because of the high correlation between %MAS and MAS_client pre-SOX, we assess whether our results are 
affected by multicollinearity. We first estimate equation (1) as a linear probability model and examine the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs). We find VIFs of 1.412 and 1.714 on %MAS and MAS_client, respectively, and the largest 
VIF in the model is 4.970 (on BigN). Kennedy (2008) suggests that VIFs of less than 10 do not warrant concerns 
about multicollinearity. Next, we re-estimate equation (1) for the pre-SOX sample excluding MAS_client. We 
continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on %MAS (1.201, significant at p < 0.001) and no other model 
variables are affected. 
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(MAS_client) and misstatements, suggesting that such services at the engagement-level, although 
permitted, may threaten audit quality.   
[insert Table 4 here] 
Because a failure to reject the null hypothesis could occur when no association exists or 
when tests lack sufficient power to reject the null, we perform several tests to assess the 
insignificant relation between %MAS and misstatements following SOX. We first assess whether 
the results are statistically insignificant because the effects are truly small or because the test 
lacks power by performing analyses similar to Chung and Kallpur (2003). Specifically, we 
evaluate the economic magnitude of an interquartile increase in our variable of interest at the 
upper 95 percent confidence interval. Because we estimate a binary outcome model, we first 
estimate the marginal effects holding all variables at their means for the logit regression 
estimated in Table 4. We find that at the upper 95 percent confidence interval (with a marginal 
effect of 0.036 for %MASit-1), an interquartile increase in %MASit-1 is estimated to increase the 
probability of misstatement by only 0.69 percent (0.036 * 0.190); this is a 5.9 percent increase 
relative to the sample mean.29  
To assess the economic magnitude of this impact, we contrast this result with the 
magnitude of an interquartile increase in other important predictors of misstatement and find that 
relative to these other predictors, the magnitude of the effect of %MASit-1 at the 95 percent 
confidence interval appears to be economically small. For instance, an interquartile increase in 
VarReturn would increase the probability of misstatement by 3.33 percent, which is a 28.7 
percent increase relative to the sample mean (and approximately 4.8 times as large as the effect 
of an interqurtile increase in %MASit-1).  
                                                 
29 We find similar results when estimating average marginal effects rather than marginal effects at the means.  
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Finally, we examine the effect of an interquartile increase in %MASit-1 at the upper 95 
percent confidence interval in the pre-SOX period. Here, we find that an interquartile increase in 
%MASit-1 is estimated to increase the probability of misstatement by 1.3 percent, which is 
approximately a 9 percent increase relative to the sample mean, and approximately 1.85 times as 
large as the effect in the post-SOX period. Based on these analyses, even at the upper end of the 
95 percent confidence interval, the economic magnitude of any effect would be small in the post-
SOX period. 
In addition, we employ a separate test to determine whether our sample size is large 
enough to detect an effect should one exist. To do this, we use the “power” function in STATA 
(the “power onemean” command). This test reveals that we would require a sample size of at 
least 18,817 observations to detect a one percent difference in the frequency of misstatement 
with 99 percent power. Moreover, our post-SOX sample size of 35,928 observations provides 
sufficient power to detect a change in the likelihood of misstatement as small as 0.73 percent. 
Because our tests are powerful enough to detect even an economically small effect on the 
likelihood of misstatement, we assert that our failure to reject the null hypothesis is unlikely to 
be due to low statistical power.  
Tests of Perceptions of Audit Quality  
 Table 5 presents the results from our second hypotheses regarding investor perceptions 
of the quality of audited earnings. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 
27,124 company-year observations. Here, we find that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in 
the short window around the earnings announcement date average 0.3 percent. The average 
analyst forecast error is -0.8 percent, and descriptive statistics for other model variables are 
consistent with those from prior research. 
[insert Table 5 here] 
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Panel B reports the results from estimating equation (2) for the full sample, and for the 
pre- and post-SOX subsamples. The coefficient estimates on FERR are positive and significant 
(consistent with theory and with prior literature) for the full and pre-SOX samples. For the post-
SOX sample, the coefficient on FERR is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 
0.125). Although the coefficient estimate on FERR*%MAS is not statistically significant for the 
full sample, it is negative and significant for the pre-SOX sample (p < 0.05) but is not 
significantly different from zero for the post-SOX sample. Consistent with inferences from our 
prior restatement tests, we find that before SOX, investors perceived the quality of audited 
earnings to be lower when accounting firms generated more of their revenues from consulting, 
but this relation does not hold post-SOX. We also find that at the engagement-level, following 
SOX, the ratio of client-specific advisory and other fees to total public audit client fees 
(MAS_client) negatively impacts investor perceptions of audit quality (consistent with our 
misstatement tests).  
To assess the insignificant association between %MAS and short-window ERCs 
following SOX, we evaluate the economic magnitude of an interquartile increase in our variable 
of interest. We find that at the lower 95 percent confidence interval (-0.327), an interquartile 
increase in FERR*%MASit-1  is estimated to reduce CARs by only 0.00018. We contrast this with 
the magnitude of an interquartile increase in another important predictor of CARs, namely the 
earnings surprise (FERR). An interquartile increase in FERR is estimated to increase CARs by 
0.001, which is approximately 5.4 times as large in magnitude as the effect of an interquartile 
increase in FERR*%MASit-1 at the lower 95 percent confidence interval. Based on this analysis, 
even at the lower end of the 95 percent confidence interval, the economic magnitude of any 
effect of %MASit-1in the post-SOX period would be small.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460102
26 
 
We also use the “power” function in STATA determine whether our sample size is 
sufficient to detect an effect should one exist. In order to detect a change of just 0.5 percent in 
CARs (a small, arbitrarily chosen change) with 99 percent power, we would need only 6,228 
observations, which we greatly exceed. In fact, our post-SOX sample size of 21,615 observations 
provides 99 percent power to detect a 0.24 percent difference (0.0024) in CARs. Because our 
tests are powerful enough to detect even an economically small effect on CARs, our failure to 
reject the null hypothesis in these tests is unlikely to be due to low statistical power.  
Additional Analyses 
 In our main analyses, we focus on the level of consulting service revenue relative to total 
accounting firm revenue. We recognize that while the level of accounting firm consulting 
revenue may impact the social norms and culture of an accounting firm, changes in the amount 
of consulting service revenue generated by a firm may also play an important role. As such, we 
examine whether changes in accounting firms’ proportion of revenue generated from consulting 
services impact audit quality. To do this, we re-estimate equation (1) incorporating the change in 
%MAS between the one- and two-year lagged percentages. We present results from these tests in 
panel A of Table 6. Similar to Table 4, we present the results using the full sample, the pre-SOX 
sample, and the post-SOX sample. Consistent with Column (2) in Table 4, we find a positive 
association between changes in the proportion of accounting firm revenue generated from 
consulting services and audit quality in the pre-SOX period. However, in the post-SOX period, 
we find a negative and significant association between changes in the proportion of accounting 
firm revenue generated from consulting services and audit quality.  
[insert Table 6 here] 
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We also examine whether the association between consulting revenues generated by 
accounting firms and impaired audit quality manifests only at certain thresholds. Social identity 
theory suggests that individuals are likely to adopt the mindset perceived as typical of the 
organization (Ashforth and Mael 1989). This theory does not specify the level of consulting 
revenues that might trigger a change in mindset or social norms, so we examine whether audit 
quality appears to suffer when accounting firms derive the majority of their revenues from 
consulting. To do this, we create an indicator variable set to one for observations where %MAS is 
50 percent or greater, and zero otherwise.30 We re-estimate equation (1) replacing %MAS with 
this indicator variable and present summarized results in panel B. Here, we find that clients are 
more likely to misstate when their accounting firms derive the majority of their revenues from 
consulting services. However, when partitioning our sample on SOX, we find that this 
association exists only in the pre-SOX period, and there is no significant association post-SOX. 
Overall, this set of tests provides evidence suggesting that even after controlling for client-
specific independence concerns (i.e., non-tax, non-audit service fees at the client level), deriving 
the majority of revenues from consulting services at the audit firm level negatively impacted 
audit quality prior to SOX. However, we find no evidence to suggest that audit firms deriving the 
majority of their revenues from consulting services provide lower quality audits following SOX.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
 We perform a number of untabulated sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are not 
driven by methodological choices. First, we note that non-reliance restatements, which are 
associated with an 8-K (Item 4.02) filing and/or an amended 10-K filing, are arguably more 
                                                 
30 In untabulated analyses, we also examine whether an association between accounting firm consulting revenues 
and the likelihood of misstatement exists using lower thresholds (e.g., 10 percent, 25 percent, etc.) but find evidence 
of this relation only when accounting firms derive the majority of their revenues from consulting services.   
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severe than the misstatements that we use in our primary tests (i.e., those identified through 
restatement announcements). We use all misstatements in our primary tests because Item 4.02 
was added as an 8-K triggering event in August 2004 and as such, any misstatements associated 
with non-reliance restatements prior to that date would not be included in the analyses. However, 
to assess the sensitivity of our results, we limit our analyses to non-reliance restatements 
identified using a feature on the Audit Analytics website. We find that our inferences are robust 
to using this subset of misstatements. Specifically, we find a positive and significant likelihood 
of misstatement identified through non-reliance restatements when accounting firms derive a 
larger amount of revenue from consulting prior to SOX, but following SOX, we do not find a 
statistically significant relation.  
Next, because the expansion of consulting service revenues has been driven by the largest 
accounting firms, we limit our analyses to clients of Big N auditors. With these more limited 
samples, we continue to find, consistent with our main tests presented in Tables 4 and 5, 
evidence of lower audit quality and perceptions of audit quality when audit firm consulting 
revenues are higher in the years before SOX but not after SOX.   
Finally, because our primary analyses are at the client level and our measure of 
consulting influence is at the audit firm level, we examine the robustness of our results to 
collapsing the analysis to the audit firm level, where variables take on yearly averages for the 
respective audit firm. Performing this analysis for all 553 audit firm-years, we find a negative 
and significant coefficient on %MAS over the full sample period, but the coefficient is 
insignificant in the pre-SOX period and negative and significant coefficient in the post-SOX 
period. We note, however, that there is a potential small audit firm bias because a small audit 
firm with only a few clients will have a large misstatement rate if even one client misstates. To 
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alleviate this potential bias, we limit the analysis to larger audit firms (i.e., the Big N and second 
tier). Although the sample size is small (at 90 observations for the full sample period, including 
23 pre-SOX and 67 post-SOX), while controlling for average public audit client non-tax non-
audit fees, average public audit client tax related fees, average public audit client size, average 
public audit client performance (ROA), and year fixed effects, we find a significantly higher 
audit firm-level misstatement rate when larger audit firms derive a larger proportion of revenues 
from consulting services prior to SOX. Following SOX, however, we do not find a statistically 
significant association between consulting revenues and misstatement rates. Assessing the 
insignificant post-SOX result, we find that even at the upper 95 percent confidence interval, the 
coefficient on %MAS is smaller in magnitude than would be necessary to reject the null 
hypothesis at the ten percent level given the estimated standard errors. 
 7. Conclusion 
Over the past decade, accounting firms have steadily increased the proportion of their 
revenues generated from consulting services, primarily by performing consulting services for 
nonaudit clients. Regulators and some academics have expressed concerns about the effect of 
this trend on the quality of audit services because they suggest that expanding the provision of 
consulting services can alter the firm’s identity and shift social norms away from providing 
professional service to pleasing the client. In addition, an increased focus on profitability could 
shift resources away from the assurance practice. Accounting firms, however, argue that 
providing consulting services improves audit quality because consulting personnel often provide 
valuable insights to audit staff when they act as specialists on audit engagements. 
We provide archival evidence on the relations between the proportion of accounting firm 
revenue generated from consulting services and restatements and perceptions of the quality of 
audited earnings. Our results suggest that before SOX, when audit clients provided an important 
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source of consulting revenues, higher levels of accounting firm consulting revenues in the 
previous year increased the likelihood of misstatement and negatively impacted clients’ annual 
ERCs, suggesting that higher levels of accounting firm consulting revenues negatively impacted 
audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we find no evidence that these 
relations persist following SOX, and even if these relations do exist, the potential economic 
magnitude of the effect is small.     
We recognize that our study is subject to data limitations. Specifically, our data for 
consulting service revenue is limited to the “Top 100 Firms” from Accounting Today. These data 
are only provided at the audit firm level and not at more disaggregated levels. Additionally, these 
fee data are provided from public, private, non-profit, and governmental clients, while other 
sources of data used in this study only cover publicly-traded audit clients. Despite this limitation, 
we believe the results of this study provide insights into the important question of the effect of 
accounting firms’ expansion of consulting services on audit quality – a question that has received 
regulatory and academic attention, but has not yet been examined empirically.  
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%MAS The proportion of U.S. management advisory and other fees (i.e., 
consulting revenues) to total U.S. revenue, calculated at the 
accounting-firm level as (MAS + Other fees) / (Audit + Tax + MAS 
+ Other fees) from Accounting Today  
Δ%MAS The change in MAS at the accounting firm level between the one 
and two year lagged percentages  
absFERR The absolute value of FERR, where FERR is analyst forecast error 
measured as the difference between reported annual earnings per 
share and the most recent median consensus analyst forecast (per 
I/B/E/S) deflated by stock price at the end of the fiscal year 
(Compustat variable PRCC_F) 
ARINV The sum of accounts receivable and inventory (Compustat variables 
RECT and INVT) divided by total assets (Compustat variable AT) 
BigN An indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is from the Big 
4 (or Arthur Andersen LLP), and zero otherwise (identified with 
Audit Analytics variable AUDITOR_FKEY) 
CAR Abnormal (market-adjusted) returns cumulated over days [-1, +1] 
relative to the annual earnings announcement 
ClientImport The ratio of total fees received from the client to the total fees 
received from all of the audit firm’s public audit clients 
DE The ratio of short- and long-term debt (Compustat variables DLC 
and DLTT) to total equity (Compustat variable SEQ) 
FERR Analyst forecast error measured as the difference between reported 
annual earnings per share and the most recent median consensus 
analyst forecast (per I/B/E/S) deflated by stock price at the end of 
the fiscal year (Compustat variable PRCC_F)  
FIN The sum of cash raised from the issuance of long-term debt, 
common stock, and preferred stock (Compustat variables DLTIS 
and SSTK) divided by total assets (Compustat variable AT) 
FREEC Cash from operations minus average capital expenditures 
(Compustat variables OANCF and CAPX) divided by lagged total 
assets (Compustat variable AT) 
ICMW An indicator variable set equal to one if a material weakness in 
internal controls over financial reporting is disclosed in the year, 
and zero otherwise 
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Industry FE Industry fixed effects using SIC codes to define industries as 
follows (Ashbaugh et al. 2003): agriculture (0100-0999), mining 
and construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), food (2000-
2111), textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals 
(2800-2824; 2840-2899), pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), extractive 
(1300-1399; 2900-2999), durable manufacturers (3000-3999, 
excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679), transportation (4000-4899), 
retail (5000-5999), services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), 
computers (3570-3579; 3670-3679; 7370-7379), and utilities (4900-
4999) 
Leverage Long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt 
(Compustat variables DLC and DLTT) divided by total assets 
(Compustat variable AT) 
LnAFEE The natural log of audit and audit-related fees (from 
AuditAnalytics) 
LnAssets The natural log of total assets (Compustat variable AT) 
LnMV The natural log of the market value of equity (Compustat variables 
PRCC_F and CSHO) 
Loss An indicator variable set equal to one if net income (Compustat 
variable NI) is less than zero, and zero otherwise 
M&A An indicator variable set equal to one if there was a merger or 
acquisition in the year (Compustat variable AQP or AQC is 
positive), and zero otherwise 
MAS_client Client-level MAS and other non-audit, non-tax fees (i.e., total non-
audit service fees less tax-related fees) paid to the auditor divided 
by the total client fees paid to the auditor (from Audit Analytics) 
Misstate  An indicator variable set equal to one if the annual financial 
statements were misstated (as revealed through a subsequent 
restatement), and zero otherwise (restatement data from Audit 
Analytics)  
MTB Market-to-book ratio (measured with Compustat variables 
PRCC_F×CSHO divided by Compustat variable SEQ) 
OffSize The natural log of the aggregate audit fees from public company 
audits, at the audit office level (using all observations in Audit 
Analytics, following Francis and Yu (2009))  
Restructure An indicator variable set equal to one if special items (Compustat 
variable SPI) as a percentage of total assets (Compustat variable 
AT) is less than or equal to -5%, and zero otherwise 
ROA Return on assets (Compustat variable IB divided by AT) 
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SecondTier An indicator variable set equal to one if the new auditor is from the 
second tier (BDO Seidman, Grant Thornton, and McGladrey & 
Pullen), and zero otherwise (identified with Audit Analytics variable 
AUDITOR_FKEY) 
Specialist An indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is an industry 
specialist, defined following Reichelt and Wang (2010) as an 
auditor whose audit fee market share in the 2-digit SIC code 
exceeds 30 percent at the national level, and zero otherwise 
SQRTTenure The square root of auditor tenure, where tenure is measured as the 
number of consecutive years of the auditor-client relationship to 
date 
STD_Return The standard deviation of market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
(where market-adjusted returns are the difference between raw 
returns and the value-weighted market returns from CRSP) over the 
previous 60 months 
Tax_client Client-level tax fees paid to the auditor divided by the total client 
fees paid to the auditor (from Audit Analytics) 
VarReturn The standard deviation of market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
(where market-adjusted returns are the difference between the raw 
returns and the value-weighted market returns from CRSP) over the 
previous 12 months  
Year FE Year fixed effects 
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Figure 1 Revenues from Audit and Assurance (A&A), Tax, and Management Advisory 
Services (MAS) as a Percentage of Total U.S. Revenue for the Accounting Today 
Top 100 Firms (2000 – 2015) 
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Figure 2  Non-Audit, Non-Tax Related Public Audit Client Fees (MAS_client) as a 
Percentage of Total Public Audit Client Fees for Sample (2000 – 2013) 
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MAS_client







Observations with a fiscal year end between 2000 and 2013, inclusive, 
after merging with Compustat, CRSP, and Audit Analytics  
 
84,177 
   Less: KPMG clients during 2005, 2006 and 2007 with missing 
            %MASit-1 data 
 
(3,672) 
   Less: observations with missing data to construct model variables (27,726) 
   Less: observations where the signing auditor office is outside the U.S. (5,751) 
   Less: observations with missing 1-year lagged %MAS (164) 
Misstatement sample 46,864 
 
Short-window market reaction tests  
Observations of firm-years from the sample above with available data 
after merging with Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and Audit Analytics 
 
27,421 
   Less: observations with stock price less than $1 at the end of the 
            fiscal year  
 
(297) 
Short-window market reaction sample 27,124 
  






Panel A: Fee-related variables 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics for fee-related variables for the company-year 
observations in our sample from 2000 through 2013 (full sample), and then separately from 2000 
through 2002 (pre-SOX sample) and 2003 through 2013 (post-SOX sample). See the Appendix 
for variable definitions. 
 
Full sample (2000 through 2013) 
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max 
%MASjt-1 46,864 0.258 0.175 0.010 0.120 0.260 0.430 0.720 
MAS_clientit 46,864 0.071 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.980 
Tax_clientit 46,864 0.098 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.151 0.873 
 
Pre-SOX sample (2000 through 2002) 
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max 
%MASjt-1 10,936 0.437 0.167 0.040 0.430 0.450 0.500 0.720 
MAS_clientit 10,936 0.259 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.455 0.980 
Tax_clientit 10,936 0.097 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.873 
 
Post-SOX sample (2003 through 2013) 
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max 
%MASjt-1 35,924 0.204 0.138 0.000 0.100 0.190 0.290 0.530 
MAS_clientit 35,924 0.014 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.864 
Tax_clientit 35,924 0.098 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.150 0.818 
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Panel B: Other variables 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics for other model variables. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. 
Variable N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
Misstateit 46,864 0.124 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LnAFEEit 46,864 13.529 1.316 12.567 13.518 14.366 
BigN 46,864 0.820 0.384 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SecondTier 46,864 0.102 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Specialistit 46,864 0.230 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SQRTTenureit 46,864 2.327 0.903 1.732 2.236 3.000 
ICMWit 46,864 0.037 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LnAssetsit 46,864 6.361 2.060 4.911 6.328 7.738 
Leverageit 46,864 0.226 0.259 0.018 0.164 0.349 
MTBit 46,864 2.651 5.543 1.083 1.808 3.155 
FINit 46,864 0.165 0.321 0.006 0.039 0.183 
FREECit 46,864 0.089 0.292 0.022 0.104 0.190 
M&Ait 46,864 0.117 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROAit 46,864 -0.053 0.409 -0.026 0.022 0.064 
Lossit 46,864 0.326 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ARINVit 46,864 0.270 0.221 0.088 0.220 0.397 
VarReturnit 46,864 0.044 0.017 0.026 0.050 0.057 
OffSizeit 46,864 17.221 1.700 16.127 17.540 18.475 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
  






Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Misstateit        0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.03 
(2) %MASjt-1         0.05  0.45 -0.01 -0.23 0.14 -0.12 -0.05 -0.24 -0.06 -0.07 
(3) MAS_clientit  0.04 0.30  -0.22 -0.28 0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.30 -0.07 -0.08 
(4) Tax_clientit    0.02 -0.11 -0.22  0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.07 
(5) LnAFEEit 0.04 -0.22 -0.14 0.16  0.34 -0.18 0.18 0.35 0.08 0.77 
(6) BigNit 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.36  -0.72 0.26 0.20 -0.07 0.31 
(7) SecondTierit -0.02 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.19 -0.72  -0.18 -0.14 0.04 -0.23 
(8) Specialistit 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.26 -0.18  0.08 -0.01 0.16 
(9) SQRTTenureit -0.02 -0.25 -0.23 0.13 0.39 0.19 -0.13 0.08  -0.01 0.27 
(10)ICMWit 0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.01  -0.03 
(11)LnAssetsit 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.14 0.75 0.30 -0.23 0.16 0.29 -0.03  
(12)Leverageit 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.10 -0.06 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.35 
(13)MTBit -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.00 
(14)FINit 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 
(15)FREECit 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.14 -0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.04 0.19 
(16)M&Ait 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.24 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.18 
(17)ROAit -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.20 0.10 -0.04 0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.26 
(18)Lossit 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.10 -0.20 -0.06 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 0.06 -0.36 
(19)ARINVit -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.21 0.09 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 
(20)VarReturnit 0.01 0.21 0.18 -0.08 -0.15 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 
(21)OffSizeit 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.44 0.58 -0.37 0.22 0.22 -0.01 0.29 
Bolded correlations are significant at 0.05. Pearson correlations are above the diagonal and Spearman correlations are below the diagonal. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. N=46,864. 
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TABLE 3 cont’d 
Correlations 
 
Variable (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) Misstateit       0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.04 
(2) %MASjt-1         0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.24 -0.05 
(3) MAS_clientit  0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.25 -0.06 
(4) Tax_clientit    0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 
(5) LnAFEEit 0.13 0.00 -0.06 0.15 0.23 0.16 -0.20 -0.11 -0.15 0.46 
(6) BigNit 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.25 0.06 0.63 
(7) SecondTierit -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.10 -0.04 -0.36 
(8) Specialistit 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.23 
(9) SQRTTenureit -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.17 0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.21 
(10) ICMWit 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 
(11)LnAssetsit 0.18 -0.05 -0.12 0.23 0.18 0.30 -0.35 -0.04 -0.05 0.32 
(12)Leverageit  -0.09 0.20 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.04 
(13)MTBit -0.15  0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 
(14)FINit 0.33 0.17  -0.27 -0.01 -0.23 0.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
(15)FREECit 0.02 0.26 0.00  0.04 0.45 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.04 
(16)M&Ait 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04  0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 
(17)ROAit -0.07 0.30 -0.09 0.66 0.03  -0.40 0.10 -0.06 0.04 
(18)Lossit -0.03 -0.15 0.08 -0.47 -0.06 -0.79  -0.12 0.12 -0.04 
(19)ARINVit -0.09 -0.14 -0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.11 -0.13  -0.01 -0.24 
(20)VarReturnit 0.03 -0.19 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.12 -0.02  -0.06 
(21)OffSizeit 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.04 -0.18 -0.06  
Bolded correlations are significant at 0.05. Pearson correlations are above the diagonal and Spearman correlations are below the diagonal. All  
variables are defined in the Appendix. N=46,864. 
  




The effect of accounting firm consulting revenue on audit quality 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
     Pre-SOX 
(2000 – 2002) 
 Post-SOX 
(2003 – 2013) 
  DV = Misstate  DV = Misstate  DV = Misstate 
Variable Pred. Coeff. Est. z-statistic  Coeff. Est. z-statistic  Coeff. Est. z-statistic 
Intercept ? -5.639*** -13.720  -6.521*** -7.200  -5.113*** -10.420 
%MASjt-1   ? 0.389*** 2.890  1.178*** 5.500  0.031 0.170 
MAS_clientit ? 0.453*** 3.160  0.254 1.520  0.623* 1.780 
Tax_clientit ? 0.139 0.890  -0.018 -0.080  0.135 0.690 
LnAFEEit ? 0.146*** 3.990  0.094 1.550  0.163*** 3.940 
BigNit ? 0.486*** 3.630  1.430*** 2.790  0.531*** 3.720 
SecondTierit ? 0.479*** 3.500  1.755*** 3.340  0.437*** 3.100 
Specialistit ? 0.111** 2.120  -0.016 -0.190  0.138** 2.360 
SQRTTenureit ? 0.001 0.040  0.056 1.030  -0.006 -0.180 
ICMWit + 1.238*** 18.610     1.220*** 18.340 
LnAssetsit ? -0.019 -0.840  0.068* 1.680  -0.048* -1.880 
Leverageit + 0.277*** 3.210  0.174 1.160  0.310*** 3.200 
MTBit ? -0.005 -1.590  -0.004 -0.580  -0.005* -1.650 
FINit + 0.085* 1.390  0.067 0.600  0.093* 1.320 
FREECit ? 0.114 1.210  0.534*** 3.000  -0.045 -0.480 
M&Ait + 0.119** 2.050  0.177 1.110  0.102** 1.660 
ROAit ? 0.205*** 2.820  0.114 1.380  0.229** 2.150 
Lossit + 0.102** 2.130  0.142** 1.780  0.090* 1.620 
ARINVit + 0.033 0.260  0.332* 1.500  -0.086 -0.600 
VarReturnit + 7.990*** 4.060  -12.836 -1.760  11.660*** 5.110 
OffSizeit ? 0.021 1.110  0.053* 1.960  -0.001 -0.050 
Industry FE  Included   Included   Included  
Year FE  Included   Included   Included  
N  46,864   10,936   35,928  
Area under ROC curve  0.662   0.680   0.664  
This table reports the relation between Accounting Today’s Top 100 accounting firms’ provision of consulting services and the likelihood of client non-reliance 
misstatements from 2000 through 2013 and broken out between pre-SOX (2000 through 2002) and post-SOX (2003 through 2013) periods. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-tailed tests, unless a direction is predicted. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. 




Earnings response coefficients  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
CAR 27,124 0.003 0.093 -0.039 0.002 0.045 
FERR 27,124 -0.008 0.334 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
%MASjt-1 27,124 0.254 0.177 0.110 0.260 0.430 
MAS_clientit-1 27,124 0.067 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Tax_clientit-1 27,124 0.103 0.131 0.000 0.051 0.162 
absFERR 27,124 0.017 0.333 0.001 0.002 0.007 
Lossit 27,124 0.276 0.447 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Restructureit 27,124 0.170 0.375 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEit 27,124 0.674 1.904 0.005 0.314 0.878 
LnMVit-1 27,124 6.647 1.761 5.413 6.535 7.743 
STD_Return t-1 27,124 0.044 0.017 0.027 0.044 0.057 
Specialistit 27,124 0.272 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OffSizeit 27,124 17.488 1.456 16.565 17.710 18.585 
ClientImportit 27,124 0.003 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.001 
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Panel B: Regression analysis 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
     Pre-SOX 
(2000 – 2002) 
 Post-SOX 
(2003 – 2013) 
  DV = CAR  DV = CAR  DV = CAR 
Variable Pred. Coeff. Est. t-statistic  Coeff. Est. t-statistic  Coeff. Est. t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.018* 1.910  0.057*** 2.850  0.001 0.130 
FERR + 0.303* 1.620  0.625* 1.480  0.249 1.150 
%MASjt-1 ? -0.011** -2.420  0.008 0.930  -0.017*** -3.300 
FERR × %MASjt-1  ? -0.067 -0.560  -0.353** -2.310  -0.007 -0.050 
MAS_clientit-1 ? -0.005 -0.870  -0.004 -0.610  -0.025* -1.920 
Tax_clientit-1 ? 0.004 0.880  0.001 0.090  0.005 0.890 
absFERR ? 0.040** 1.960  0.092* 1.870  0.040* 1.860 
Lossit ? -0.007*** -3.760  -0.008** -2.170  -0.006*** -2.990 
Restructureit ? -0.001 -0.330  0.004 0.990  -0.002 -1.060 
DEit ? 0.000 0.920  0.000 -0.060  0.001 1.160 
LnMVit-1 ? -0.001* -1.620  0.000 -0.470  -0.001 -1.580 
STD_Returnit-1 ? -0.158* -1.980  -0.417* -1.900  -0.127 -1.450 
Specialistit ? 0.000 0.360  0.002 0.710  -0.001 -0.600 
OffSizeit ? 0.000 0.360  -0.001 -1.590  0.001 1.030 
ClientImportit ? 0.023 1.020  0.135*** 3.310  0.006 0.240 
Industry FE ? Included   Included   Included  
Year FE ? Included   Included   Included  
FERR × MAS_clientit-1 ? -0.082 -0.720  -0.196** -2.260  -0.478* -1.780 
FERR × Tax_clientit-1 ? -0.121 -0.850  -0.432** -2.480  -0.014 -0.070 
FERR × absFERR ? -0.001 -0.320  0.007 0.370  0.000 0.050 
FERR × Lossit ? -0.107** -2.220  -0.245*** -2.890  -0.135** -2.540 
FERR × Restructureit ? -0.011 -0.350  -0.030 -0.640  0.014 0.310 
FERR × DEit ? 0.000 0.120  0.010* 1.930  -0.004 -0.790 
FERR ×  LnMVit-1 ? 0.032** 2.240  0.028 1.340  0.031* 1.710 
FERR × STD_Returnit-1 ? -0.645 -0.440  -5.695 -1.040  -0.131 -0.080 
FERR × Specialistit ? 0.027 0.690  0.001 0.010  0.036 0.640 
FERR × OffSizeit ? -0.011 -1.140  0.005 0.340  -0.008 -0.630 
FERR × ClientImportit ? 0.585 0.880  2.246** 2.340  0.142 0.210 
FERR × Industry FE ? Included   Included   Included  
FERR × Year FE ? Included   Included   Included  




          
N  27,124   5,809   21,615  
Adjusted R2  0.015   0.028   0.018  
This table reports the relation between Accounting Today’s Top 100 accounting firms’ provision of consulting services and clients’ short-window (i.e., 3-day, 
centered on the earnings announcement dates) earnings response coefficients from 2000 through 2013 and broken out between pre-SOX (2000 through 2002) and 
post-SOX (2003 through 2013) periods. Panel A provides descriptive statistics and Panel B provides the results from estimating the OLS regression. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-tailed p-values. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
  





Additional analyses on the effect of accounting firm consulting revenue on audit quality 
 
Panel A: Change in %MAS 
     Pre-SOX 
(2000 – 2002) 
 Post-SOX 
(2003 – 2013) 
  DV = Misstate  DV = Misstate  DV = Misstate 
Variable Pred. Coeff. Est. z-statistic  Coeff. Est. z-statistic  Coeff. Est. z-statistic 
Δ%MASjt-2 to t-1   ? 0.011 0.170  1.049*** 4.060  -0.200** -2.160 
MAS_clientit ? 0.531*** 3.270  0.350* 1.830  0.650* 1.850 
Tax_clientit ? 0.150 0.940  -0.017 -0.070  0.139 0.710 
Intercept & Other Controls  Included   Included   Included  
Industry FE  Included   Included   Included  
Year FE  Included   Included   Included  
N  42,829   7,588   35,241  
Area under ROC curve  0.665   0.675   0.664  
 
Panel B: Majority of revenues derived from MAS 
     Pre-SOX 
(2000 – 2002) 
 Post-SOX 
(2003 – 2013) 
  DV = Misstate  DV = Misstate  DV = Misstate 
Variable Pred. Coeff. Est. z-statistic  Coeff. Est. z-statistic  Coeff. Est. z-statistic 
MAS_50%jt-1 ? 0.344*** 5.100  0.333*** 4.770  -1.096 -1.540 
MAS_clientit ? 0.425*** 2.960  0.257 1.530  0.622* 1.770 
Tax_clientit ? 0.141 0.900  -0.025 -0.110  0.137 0.700 
Intercept & Other Controls  Included   Included   Included  
Industry FE  Included   Included   Included  
Year FE  Included   Included   Included  
N  46,864   10,936   35,928  
Area under ROC curve  0.663   0.678   0.664  
Panel A presents the Accounting Today’s Top 100 firms’ provision of consulting services two years prior and the likelihood of client misstatements from 2000 
through 2013 and broken out between pre-SOX (2000 through 2002) and post-SOX (2003 through 2013) periods. Panel B presents the relation between changes 
in firms’ provision of consulting services and the likelihood of client misstatements for the same periods. Panel C presents the relation between different levels of 
the firms’ provision of consulting services and the likelihood of client misstatements for the same periods. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-tailed tests, unless a direction is predicted. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
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